

BACKGROUND BRIEFING BY SENIOR U.S. DEFENSE OFFICIAL
 OTTAWA, CANADA
 MAY 16, 1994

SENIOR DEFENSE OFFICIAL: A few words about why Secretary Perry is making this trip. When he became Secretary, I met with him to talk about the travel schedule. I'm always interested in having him go to my parts of the world, not to other places. He said then that he wanted to make his first trip as Secretary of Defense to a NATO country and of the NATO countries, he wanted his first trip to be to Canada. He thought that was fitting recognition of the special relationship that we have with our continental ally. He wanted me to put that at the head of the queue. There are other trips. He's had to go to Brussels. He's certainly been other places, but this is, in fact, his first trip to a first bilateral meeting with a NATO country and that was at his specific request that we do that in Canada.

This is also a critical time in U.S.-Canadian relations because we have just finished a Bottom-Up Review that looked at how we would size our forces and plan our strategies for the post-Cold War Era. Canada is also going through a parliamentary review. It's certainly not up to an American Secretary of Defense to tell the Canadians how to do their own review, anymore than the Canadians ought to tell us how to do the Bottom-Up Review. It's an opportunity for allies to share notes on this. Perry has already, in his first meeting today with Minister Ouellet, talked about the Bottom-Up Review, how we did it and how it has now provided the basis for funding in the United States Congress that will be within 1% of what we requested. It has proved a very useful exercise in the United States for providing a rationale for forces that has been acceptable in Congress. This is the first time in years that we've gone through the Congressional review of our Defense budget proposal and come out with so little rancor and so close to the bottom line.

We have a number of global issues that are very important to both countries. Canada's long experience with peacekeeping is very much on our minds as we look at Bosnia, Haiti, the whole philosophy of peacekeeping. We have much to learn from Canada. In fact, if you look at our PDD 25, you'll find in there some things I'm sure Canadians would be very comfortable with, in fact, could have written themselves based on the scores of peacekeeping operations Canada has been involved in over the past several decades.

So that's what brings the Secretary here -- not MCM testing, not taking pledges for troops to send to Haiti, but to underscore the importance of our bilateral relationship, the need to stand together in the post-Cold War era as we did in World War I, World War II, and Korea, to compare notes on the Bottom-Up Review, and to get some sense of where the parliamentary review is headed.

This afternoon he met with Minister Ouellet. Minister Collenette sat in on that meeting and they discussed a number of issues. I'll give you some background on these.

The first issue was cruise missile testing. Secretary Perry, because Minister Ouellet was not at the airport, simply repeated to him what he had said at the airport. That is that the cruise missile issue ought to be seen in a larger context and that is a bilateral relationship of testing. We have a number of requirements for various types of weapon systems tests. So does Canada. We have a variety of test facilities. So does Canada. We ought to identify the opportunities for some mutually beneficial exchange in there. When does it make good sense for the United States to take advantage of Canadian facilities and vice versa. This bilateral testing relationship is one aspect that binds us together in a special security relationship. We have no plans at this time for further cruise missile testing. We do not have a request on the table that would force the government of Canada to accept or deny permission. It is not at this moment an issue for the United States.

They talked about NORAD, another one of these linkages in our special relationship, another binding. It's another thing that binds us together. We have accelerated a review of NORAD. NORAD comes up for a review in 1996 at the request of the Canadian government. We have accelerated that review. In fact it is underway now, and we hope that it is finished by the first of September which will give the parliamentary defense review committee ample time to fold that review into its own report.

Minister Ouellet asked Perry for a readout on the Friday meeting of the contact group on Bosnia. Secretary Perry provided an interim report and said that he was certain that Secretary Christopher was planning to be in touch with Minister Ouellet so he would simply give him an interim read on this. I expect within the next day there will be a formal State Department, Ministry of External Affairs, report.

The Secretary's observation here was that this was a major step forward. For the first time the United States, the European Union, and Russia have agreed on a 51-49% partition. So all of these parties now have made an explicit commitment to a division of territory that would accord 51% to the Bosnian Muslims and Croats, and 49% to the Serbs. All of the parties agreed on a four-month cease-fire. All of the parties agreed that the contact group could become more actively involved in developing a peace plan. For those of you who don't follow this issue very closely, for the United States, this was a significant shift because our position had been to this point let the parties themselves come up on their own with an agreement. We have reversed that but if you read the communiqué, allowed the contact group to become more actively engaged in the process of seeking a solution.

Q. Is there any indication here that the two sides have accepted this?

SENIOR U.S. DEFENSE OFFICIAL: The public, initial response by both parties was negative. Before this point, the concern was that the Russians had never publicly accepted a proposition that would say to the Serbs, "Your people now have over 70% of the

territory. We think that you should accept 49%." They had never said that explicitly. There was always a concern that they would be running away from the rest of the international community in the settlement. There was some concern in Europe that the United States was encouraging the Bosnian government. And, indeed, some people in the United States, not in this administration, but other people in Congress and elsewhere, have encouraged the Bosnians to hold out for more. But now we, the U.S. government, have joined this international consensus that says to the Bosnians, 51%.

A discussion between the two ministers on the arms embargo and the Dole Amendment -- Secretary Perry assured Minister Ouellet we will fight the Dole Amendment. We do not support a unilateral lifting of the arms embargo. We do not encourage clandestine efforts to get arms through the embargo to the Muslims because our purpose is to encourage all parties to come to the peace table. A circumvention of the embargo is not supported by the United States.

Q: There was a report a couple weeks ago, I think in Jane's, that the Bosnian-Muslims were, in fact, quite capable of producing large numbers of their own munitions. Is that the assessment of the people at the Pentagon as well?

SENIOR U.S. DEFENSE OFFICIAL: There are a number of small arms factories in Bosnia capable of producing ammunition and small rifles and other small arms. Bosnia was the arms production center of Yugoslavia so a lot of that is there. A lot of it is not operational but it's certainly enough to keep them supplied with ammunition.

Minister Ouellet told Secretary Perry that Canada had recently extended its commitment to UNPROFOR for another six months. Both sides ended this discussion on Bosnia hopeful that this Friday's Geneva initiative will allow the peace plan to get back on track.

The last discussion point was Haiti. Here again, substantial consensus between the two parties. Both supported implementation of the Governor's Island Agreement. Both speculated on what might be next steps in Haiti. There would be a need for some way to assure domestic security in Haiti. There will be a need for an aid program to revive the economy and there needs to be some particular effort made to get agriculture up and going again. Minister Ouellet said there are 75,000 Haitians in Montreal legally. Maybe more not legal -- visiting. Some of those people might be willing to go back to aid in this reconstruction. Both sides agreed that sanctions were very important, sanctions must be maintained. Minister Collenette and Secretary Perry will continue this discussion tomorrow.

They also discussed Argentina. The closing of a Navy base in Newfoundland. There is considerable concern about how we will leave this base. What environmental standards will be met. This is an issue raised by Minister Ouellet. Secretary Perry assured him that we would give full consideration to this issue and that this was an administration that took environmental concerns very seriously -- the Clinton administration. He would assure that his Deputy Undersecretary for Environmental

Affairs was personally engaged in this issue -- Sherri Goodman -- She doesn't know this yet, but you can tell her the news.

Q -- When is it to be closed?

SENIOR U.S. DEFENSE OFFICIAL: It is now closed -- 30 September is the formal closing, but everything is out of there already -- There is a question of residual value -- How much does Canada owe the United States for the value of the facilities there? There is a question about compensation for the civilian personnel who are going to be let go -- The most important of these issues is the question of environmental cleanup.

Q -- You talk about learning from Canada on peacekeeping -- You mention there's some pieces of PDD 25 that would conform to Canada's views -- Could you elaborate on what you hope to learn from Canada in terms of -- and why you're looking to Canada for advice on the subject? And then could you describe some of the pieces of PDD 25 you feel particularly conform to Canada's view of things?

SENIOR U.S. DEFENSE OFFICIAL: For the past 30 years, Canada has made peacekeeping a special part of its defense repertoire. In fact, you might even be able to see it from here, a monument to peacekeeping right down the street. Canada has been involved scores of peacekeeping operations involving hundreds of thousands of Canadian soldiers all over the world. I doubt that there is another country on earth that has the breadth or the depth of experience in peacekeeping in all sorts of places. Canada knows what works and what doesn't. As you know, the United States during the Cold War stayed out of this peacekeeping business. We had our eyes on different things and it was, for most peacekeeping operations, inappropriate for the United States to become involved. We came to this issue as a super power involved in the Cold War. We come to peacekeeping in the post Cold War era. We understand this is an indispensable aspect of security policy in the post Cold War era, and one where we have to take our rightful place.

We look to Canada for the lessons learned from experience over the past decades. Their view is peacekeeping -- you can't do peacekeeping in an ad hoc manner. You have to shape from the beginning a viable strategy for peacekeeping. You have to have a plan that has a reasonable prospect for success. You have to have a budget. You have to have a time frame. You have to have an exit strategy. You go into peacekeeping knowing the command and control arrangements, making sure that you're satisfied with those. These are points that Minister Ouellet -- he laid these out just off the top of his head, the wisdom that Canada has accumulated on the question of peacekeeping. As he did this, I thought to myself, this sounds a lot like PDD 25. I don't know if there's any perfect correspondence here.

Q -- It is my recollection that on PDD 25, the administration point was that peacekeeping is not and will not be a centerpiece in U.S. military policy. That the will and the ability to act unilaterally will remain in the forefront. It won't be separate budgeting for peacekeeping forces. There seemed to be a real downplaying of peacekeeping. Am I misreading or

SENIOR U.S. DEFENSE OFFICIAL: I don't think I said it was a centerpiece. I said it's an indispensable part of security policy in the post Cold War era. It's not for us ever going to be a centerpiece. I think you could say for Canada it is a dominant aspect of Canadian security policy. For us it will be important, but we have other obligations around the world.

Having said that, if you were going to engage in peacekeeping, and we have and will continue to do so, it is prudent to set some parameters on that. What sort of conditions ought to be met before you go in? What kind of procedures ought to be in place as you do these operations? How do you get out? In this talk about Haiti, Minister Ouellet did most of the talking on Haiti. That's partly because Canada has a lot of experience in Haiti, and Minister Ouellet has personal experience. He's been there, he's got a very large Haitian constituency. He knows this issue. Secretary Perry was very interested in hearing from him. But, it's also, again, because Canada -- when Canadians talk about peacekeeping, the world ought to listen. They've done it in all sorts of places under all sorts of conditions.

Q: Did they talk about the U.S. proposal on peacekeeping policy to reduce the United States share (mandible)?

SENIOR U.S. DEFENSE OFFICIAL: They did not go into it.

Q: Did they urge the United States not to get involved militarily in Haiti?

SENIOR U.S. DEFENSE OFFICIAL: They did not. The issue of military intervention never came up.

Q: I'm not trying to develop a "Canada-U.S. tensions" thing here. I'm just suggesting, in other words, you can see in Bosnia and Haiti some clear areas where Canadians as the people who are involved in peacekeeping there, especially in Bosnia where they have people on the ground, might be concerned about some of the initiatives of the United States that might cost them lives or create problems for them. I'm wondering if there were discussions sort of along those lines. By way of their saying, we'd really prefer you take up more of the peacekeeping burden, for example.

SENIOR U.S. DEFENSE OFFICIAL: This did not come up, and I admit there was only limited time -- 45 minutes they were together, you can't talk about everything. I wouldn't read too much into their not raising particular aspects of this issue. It's no secret in Ottawa or in Washington that there have been differences in view on the whole question of NATO and UNPROFOR, and Canada, with troops on the ground, has been very mindful and insisted that the United States and its other NATO allies take great concerns as NATO shapes its exclusion zones and other uses of air power -- to pay special attention to the forces on the ground.

Q: Was there any discussion of what comes next in terms of putting some teeth into the embargo? It's all very well to the naval patrol off shore, but in terms of intercepting aircraft that are breaking security council resolutions and doing something about policing the land war in the Dominican Republic.

SENIOR U.S. DEFENSE OFFICIAL: We didn't spend a lot of time on this. Both agreed that sanctions were very important, we must maintain the sanctions agreement. We must make sure that it is effective. That's as far as they took that issue.

Q: On the peacekeeping question. I've tried to understand the U.S. reluctance to allow U.S. ground forces to operate on peacekeeping missions under the command of a foreign general. What's the apprehension?

SENIOR U.S. DEFENSE OFFICIAL: Again, this is not an issue that came up at all here.

Q: I'm taking advantage of having you here.

SENIOR U.S. DEFENSE OFFICIAL: My own interpretation of -- certainly this was colored by our experience in Somalia. Even though the American soldiers who were killed were working for an American, didn't come under foreign control, the whole experience of Somalia raised for the United States the question of American troops risking their lives for a non-American commander. I think the issue is not foreign commanders, non-American commanders, per se, because in NATO every day American troops work for non-American commanders. But the reason that's not a problem is that we understand the mission. We understand procedures. We work together in developing doctrine. We are allies who have worked together for decades and tend to see issues in pretty much the same way. If we could be assured of that kind of NATO standard in a peacekeeping operation, I think that we would have almost no hesitation subordinating American troops to foreign command.

What we have tried to do in this PDD is establish conditions that would try to replicate that rather happy experience in NATO. That is, a clear understanding of the rules of engagement. The PDD makes clear that American troops would be put under the command of foreign militaries, but that will happen under certain conditions. The most important of those is that we will retain operational control of those forces. That is to say, a military commander isn't going to give an order to some sergeant to go do something. He'll give an order to the American commander. If the American commander is assured that this order is legal, that is, in accordance with international law, and fits the rules of engagement that have been worked out in advance, then he will execute the mission. If not, then he will appeal. It's a way of responding to the concern that once you get out of NATO, you could find yourself putting American troops under the control of someone who has a very different value system, a very different sense of how the operation is to be run, a very different philosophy of how military forces ought to be used. It's an attempt to articulate conditions under which we would be comfortable surrendering operational

command and at the same time we draw this distinction between operational command and operational control that's very important.

Q (inaudible comments). I guess we're only several days away now from the Russians announcing their own concept of Partnership for Peace, pragmatic partnership (inaudible). I'm curious to know whether that was raised today in terms of trying to get a United States-Canadian policy perhaps coordinated on that kind of issue.

SENIOR U.S. DEFENSE OFFICIAL: It did not come up today. I am certain it will come up tomorrow in discussions with Minister Collenette because Collenette and Perry, Tuesday morning, will be in Brussels together for the next defense ministers meeting. They'll have the defense planning committee, the nuclear planning group, and that evening, Tuesday, the 24th, Grachev will be there to give his briefing on Russian military doctrine. I am almost certain that. (change of tape)

What they have said in many forms, including public ones, is that what they would like is some kind of special relationship with NATO. We have told them that the Partnership for Peace gives them a special relationship with NATO. That the nature of the partnership is a bilateral relationship between each signatory state and NATO. It's not some big club where there's a high table for the major powers and then the lesser folks are off at a table by the kitchen. It's a series of bilateral relationships. Inherent in this Partnership for Peace idea, each relationship is special. They don't buy that. They want some recognition that they are not Albania. That they are a power to be reckoned with. Ministers will discuss next week what we can do. There is no way that we will ever put NATO in the position where we will debate issues at 16, make a decision, and then check with Moscow to see if it's OK. That will never happen. Is there some way we could establish a regular discussion? Some dialogue with them that would recognize their position in European security? I think so. I think most NATO defense ministers would accept that. Most NATO defense ministers would accept that this "16 plus one" relationship is going to be the most important one in the Partnership for Peace should they choose to come in.

It will be a very interesting two days in Brussels. First of all to see what Grachev says, not only about Partnership for Peace, but more generally about NATO and Russian military doctrine. And then to see how these ministers come back to him. I think it's wait and see.

END